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When Dreams Become a Royal Road to Confusion: Realistic Dreams,
Dissociation, and Fantasy Proneness
ERIC RASSIN, PH.D.,1 HARALD MERCKELBACH, PH.D.,2 and VICTOR SPAAN, M.A.2
Scientific discussions about false memories have, so far, mainly focused on
external determinants (e.g., therapeutic interventions). However, in some cases,
false memories might develop more spontaneously. For example, difficulties in
distinguishing between dreams and reality may lead to false memories. The present
article discusses two studies (N 5 85 and 255, respectively) that examined to what
extent such difficulties occur. In both studies, a nontrivial minority of respondents
(11.8% and 25.9%, respectively) reported that they had had the experience of not
being able to discriminate between dream and reality. As expected, respondents
who reported this type of confusion scored higher on fantasy proneness and
dissociation measures than respondents who did not report this confusion.
—J Nerv Ment Dis 189:478–481, 2001
In recent years, false memories have been the
focus of lively discussions. For example, skeptics
have proclaimed false memories as an alternative
explanation for recovered memories (i.e., memories
of childhood traumas that were lost for longer time
periods but are then recovered during psychother-
apy; e.g., Loftus, 1993; Poole et al., 1995). False
memories have also been studied in the context of
false confessions. Research has shown that, during
police interrogations, people may become over-
whelmed by post-hoc misinformation about a crime
and can, subsequently, be brought to believe that
they were involved in that crime, whereas, in fact,
they were not (Gudjonsson, 1992; Kassin, 1997).
Experimental studies on false memories have
emphasized external sources such as therapeutic
interventions (e.g., guided imagination, Garry et al.,
1996; hypnosis, Spanos, 1996; dream interpretation,
Mazzoni and Loftus, 1998), and suggestive tech-
niques during police interviews (Kassin, 1997) as the
primary antecedents of false memories. However,
there are reasons to believe that false memories may
also develop in a more spontaneous fashion, that
is, may arise from internal sources. For example,
Lipinski and Pope (1994) described several cases in
which patients were diagnosed as suffering from
posttraumatic stress disorder. Although this diagno-
sis was partly based on the presence of traumatic
flashbacks, these flashbacks turned out to be obses-
sional fantasies rather than trauma memories.
Hence, it seems that false memories may be rooted
in failures to differentiate between dreams or lively
fantasies on the one hand and reality on the other.
Experimental evidence for this possibility comes
from a study by Mazzoni and Loftus (1996). These
authors found that participants tend to mistake
words uniquely referring to their own dreams for
items generated by the experimenter. More pre-
cisely, the authors invited their participants to de-
scribe their recent dreams in a series of single
words. A few days later, participants were given a
list of words and were asked to estimate the number
of letters that these words consisted of. Some of the
words were generated by the experiment leader,
whereas others were derived from the subjects’ self-
reported list of dream-describing words. When
asked whether they recognized any of the words in
the list, subjects frequently failed to recognize words
as originating from their own dream descriptions.
Although these results suggest that people may
spontaneously develop memories of “events” that
were actually internally generated memories (i.e.,
dreams), the question remains whether this also
occurs outside the laboratory, to an extent that makes
it relevant to discussions about false memories.
It can be argued that dreams can only serve as
powerful antecedents of false memories if two con-
ditions are met. First, the dream must be highly
realistic and must have an unpleasant content, as is
usually the case with recovered memories and false
confessions. Second, the dream must give rise to a
behavioral consequence (such as a changed attitude
toward persons who figure in the dream). The work
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of Ohayon et al. (1996) bears relevance to the first
issue. These authors found that a substantial per-
centage of healthy volunteers reported to have very
vivid and realistic dreams at least twice a week.
Thirty-seven percent of the respondents experi-
enced such dreams during sleep onset (hypnagogic
hallucinations), whereas 12% experienced these
dreams primarily during awakening (hypnopompic
hallucinations).
The present studies examined the prevalence of
highly realistic dreams in nonclinical samples. We
also explored to what extent such dreams may have
behavioral consequences (e.g., confronting people
who acted in the dream). Finally, people reporting
realistic dreams were compared with people with-
out such dreams with respect to fantasy proneness
and dissociation. This was done because previous
work has shown that both phenomena are impli-
cated in the tendency to develop false memories
(e.g., Hyman and Billings, 1998).
Study 1
Participants
Undergraduate students (N 5 85; 77 women) com-
pleted a short questionnaire about dreams. Mean age
of this sample was 22.4 years (SD 5 4.8; range: 19 to
48 years).
Results
The questionnaire contained five items. First, par-
ticipants were asked whether they had ever experi-
enced such a realistic dream that, for a short period
of time after waking up, it left them thinking it had
really happened. Fifty-eight participants (68%) ac-
knowledged having experienced such realistic
dreams. The second item concerned the frequency
of this type of dream: its average frequency was 2.0
times per month (SD 5 3.4). The third item ad-
dressed sleep disturbances: none of the participants
reported such disturbances. The next two questions
addressed whether realistic dreams sometimes tend
to take the form of false memories. Participants
were asked whether they had ever acted against
others on the basis of dream content; this seemed to
apply to five respondents (5.8%). The question of
whether participants, at present, had memories that
they were unable to trace to a real event or dream
was endorsed by six respondents (7.1%). Given that
one respondent endorsed the latter two questions, it
can be argued that 10 participants (11.8%) reported
having experienced realistic dreams with possible
behavioral consequences.
Study 2
Participants
In a second study, we sought to replicate the
results of study 1. Thereto, a similar, yet more ex-
tended questionnaire was completed by 255 respon-
dents (175 women). Mean age was 21.1 years (SD 5
2.3; range: 18 to 38 years).
Results
Here, 199 respondents (78%) reported familiarity
with highly realistic dreams. The mean frequency of
such dreams was 2.3 per month (SD 5 3.3).3 Partic-
ipants were asked to indicate how realistic these
dreams were using a visual analogue scale (VAS)
ranging from 0 (moderately) to 100 (extremely). The
mean score on this VAS was 64.5 (SD 5 18.6). A total
of 115 respondents (58%) indicated that they expe-
rienced realistic dreams primarily during awaken-
ing, 6 respondents (3%) reported dreaming realisti-
cally during sleep onset, and 78 participants (39%)
were unable to indicate during which stage realistic
dreams generally occurred. Although none of the
participants suffered from serious sleep distur-
bances, 58 respondents (29.1%) reported irregular
sleep patterns. In this sample, 25 participants (9.8%)
reported having acted against others on the basis of
what turned out to be a dream instead of a real
event. Forty-one participants (16.1%) currently had
memories of which the origin (dream vs. real event)
was unclear to them. In sum, as in study 1, a small
but considerable minority reported having experi-
enced dreams with possible behavioral conse-
quences, and thus with the potential to develop false
memories. Table 1 summarizes the main findings of
the two studies.
3 It should be noted that in both studies, the distribution of
dream frequency was skewed to the right (skewness 5 2.7 and
3.0, respectively). In both studies, the median was 1.0, whereas
the ranges were .1 to 16 and .01 to 20, respectively.
TABLE 1
Overview of the Main Results of the Two Studies
Study 1 Study 2
Sample size N 5 85 N 5 255
Respondents reporting realistic
dreams 58 199
(68%) (78%)
Respondents reporting dreams with
behavioral consequences 5 25
(5.8%) (9.8%)
Respondents reporting memories of
uncertain origin 6 41
(7.1%) (16.1%)
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Individual Differences
To explore whether the tendency to experience
realistic dreams with behavioral consequences is
attributable to individual differences, two groups of
participants were selected from the sample in study
2. The first group consisted of 26 respondents who
never dreamt realistically, whereas the second
group consisted of 22 respondents who had either
acted upon the content of a dream, or currently had
memories of uncertain origin. Thus, a sample of 48
participants (36 women; mean age 5 22.1; SD 5 3.5;
range: 18 to 38) were asked to complete the follow-
ing questionnaires.
The Creative Experiences Questionnaire (CEQ;
Merckelbach et al., in press) contains 25 yes/no
items (e.g., “I still remember a lot of events that
happened to me before I reached the age of three
years”). Every endorsed item yields one point. Con-
sequently, total scores range from 0 to 25 with
higher scores indicating higher levels of fantasy
proneness.
The Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES; Bernstein
and Putman, 1986) consists of 28 items (e.g., “Being
not sure if a remembered event happened or was a
dream”). The respondent indicates to what extent
each statement applies to him/her by ticking a visual
analogue scale (VAS) ranging from 0 (not at all) to
100 (very much). Total DES scores are expressed as
the mean of the 28 items, that is, they range from 0
to 100, with higher scores indicating more self-re-
ported dissociative symptoms.
The mean scores of both groups are presented in
Table 2. As can be seen, participants with realistic
dreams scored higher on both measures than partic-
ipants without such dreams, although it should be
noted that scores of the former group remained
within the normal range. Interestingly, women were
overrepresented in the realistic dream group. Of the
22 realistic dreamers, 20 were women, whereas 16 of
the 26 nonrealistic dreamers were women (x2 5 5.5,
p 5 .02). After the potential influence of gender
was corrected for in an ANOVA, the main effect of
(non)realistic dreams remained significant for both
measures (both ps , .05).
Discussion
Our results suggest that in nonclinical samples,
realistic dreams occur relatively frequently: that is,
68% to 78% of the respondents reported being famil-
iar with such dreams. As well, a nontrivial minority
of respondents reported having experienced more
persistent realistic dreams such that they either had
believed for some period of time that the dream
content referred to real events (which led them to
confront others; 6% to 10%), or at present had mem-
ories of which they were uncertain whether they
pertained to a dream or real event (7% to 16%).
Additionally, these persistent realistic dreams were
found to be linked to heightened levels of fantasy
proneness and dissociation, although no clinical
ranges were reached.
How should one interpret the finding that a non-
trivial minority of nonclinical participants was famil-
iar with the experience of confusing dreams with
real events? One possibility is that this phenomenon
is a special case of what has been termed source
monitoring errors (Johnson et al., 1993), in which
people confuse memories of their imaginations with
memories of real events. The fact that participants
who reported realistic dreams also had heightened
fantasy proneness and dissociation scores supports
this interpretation, because one common theme in
both measures is the tendency to misattribute imag-
inations to reality. Interestingly, there is not only a
considerable overlap between fantasy proneness
and dissociation (e.g., Merckelbach et al., 1999), but
both measures also covary with schizotypy (e.g.,
Merckelbach et al., 2000b). The potential link be-
tween dream-reality confusion and schizotypy war-
rants further study, because there are strong indica-
tions that schizotypy is a powerful predictor of
nightmare distress (e.g., Claridge et al., 1997). In-
deed, some authors have interpreted nightmares and
schizotypy characteristics as manifestations of rela-
tively permeable boundaries between internal imag-
inations and external reality (e.g., Hartman, 1991).
Another and more mundane interpretation of our
findings is that they reflect fantasy prone indi-
viduals’ tendency to over-endorse symptoms (e.g.,
Merckelbach et al., 2000a). That is, self-reports of
highly realistic dreams might be an artifact of the
positive response bias linked to fantasy proneness.
What argues against such an interpretation is that
fantasy proneness scores of realistic dreamers were
within the normal range (e.g., Merckelbach et al., in
press). Nevertheless, a clear limitation of the current
studies is that they relied on self-reports. This could
produce an overestimation of the prevalence of re-
alistic dreams but could also lead to an underesti-
TABLE 2
Mean Scores (and Standard Deviations) of Participants with
(N 5 22) and without (N 5 26) Persistent Realistic Dreams
Realistic
Dreamers
Nonrealistic
Dreamers t pa
CEQb 7.6 (5.2) 4.5 (3.3) 2.5 .01
DESc 18.2 (13.9) 10.9 (4.8) 2.3 .01
a All presented p-values are one-tailed.
b Creative Experiences Questionnaire.
c Dissociative Experiences Scale.
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mation of the phenomenon (some participants may
still mistake their dreams for real events).
Conclusion
The main implication of the current findings is
that in a minority of cases, false memories may be
rooted in dreams. Thus, our findings concur with
those of Mazzoni and Loftus (1996), who found that
confusion between dream and reality can be in-
duced in an experimental context, and with those of
Ohayon et al. (1996), who noted that realistic
dreams are prevalent in the general population, dur-
ing sleep onset and waking up.
It should be noted that respondents in our study
reported adverse dream contents (e.g., being held
prisoner, being molested, being insulted, or being
prosecuted). This makes the findings relevant to the
ongoing discussion about false memories and their
legal ramifications. Unpleasant, or even traumatic,
memories may in some cases pertain to nothing
more than a dream (see also Pendergrast, 1995).
Previous studies in this domain have emphasized the
role of suggestive therapeutic techniques in the eti-
ology of false memories. The present findings seem
to imply that at least in some cases, such memories
may arise spontaneously, that is, in the absence of
external forces. Clearly, this spontaneous pathway
to false memories requires further study.
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